I. Introduction
Interfirm benevolence, the extent to which a buyer believes that the supplier has the intention and motivation to act beneficially to the buyer (Ganesan 1994) , is an important dimension of trust, along with credibility and honesty (Doney and Cannon 1997) .
Trust has been a key concept explaining interfirm relationships (Mayer, Davis, and Shoorman 1995; Wilson 1995; Oh et al. 1997; . Interfirm trust indicates the willingness to rely on an exchange partner whose behavior is not under its control (Doney and Cannon 1997) . Researchers have found that trust in a partner's reliable behavior allows the party to accept short-term disadvantages and seek long-term benefits from the relationship (Doney and Cannon 1997; Ganesan 1994; Zaltman and Moorman 1988 ).
There are a couple of governance mechanisms in interfirm relationships, such as vertical integration (Stump and Heide 1996), vertical control (Bello and Gilliland 1997) , monitoring (Lal 1990) , contracts (Lusch and Brown 1996) , and relational norms (Heide and John 1992) . Despite having advanced knowledge of control mechanisms, prior research has exposed several gaps that must be addressed.
First, few studies have investigated the effect that benevolence has on interfirm performance regarding 94  유통연구 22권 2호 the cost of interfirm governance. Since interfirm trust plays an important role in interfirm relationships (Elangovan and Shapiro 1998) , the use of interfirm governance could be affected by interfirm benevolence. Trust allows firms to reduce transaction costs (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998) , increase cooperation (Schurr and Ozanne 1985) , and build commitment (Geyskens et al., 1996) in the relationship with transaction partners. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the level of interfirm governance with which benevolence reduces an exchange party's need to use interfirm governance.
Second, prior research on interfirm performance does not investigate the conditions under which interfirm governance results in higher performance.
Since benevolence reduces the need to use interfirm governance, interfirm performance could improve.
However, there is no research done on how interfirm benevolence improves interfirm performance.
The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of the moderating effect that interfirm benevolence has on the relationship between interfirm governance and interfirm performance. This study accomplishes this by discussing the role of benevolence that may increase interfirm performance in the relationship between a buyer and a seller. In the next section, the theoretical background for trust and control mechanisms will be discussed. Then, the research hypotheses are developed.
Ⅱ. Theoretical Backgrounds and Hypotheses

Interfirm Governance
Interfirm governance refers to the extent to which a firm has control over another firm's key decisions (Heide 1994) . Interfirm governance controls the exchange party through the party's effort to influence a partner's action (Bello and Gilliland 1997; Stump and Heide 1996) . For example, a buyer's interfirm governance may involve control over the supplier's activities, such as the quality of parts or on-time delivery. Interfirm governance enhances a buyer's ability to detect opportunistic behavior by a supplier, which leads to positive improvements in performance (Leenders and Fearon 1993) .
Interfirm governance is based upon the premise that a buyer possesses the power to force its supplier to follow a given request (Weitz and Jap 1995) . If the buyer does not have any power, it cannot force its partner to observe its direction. For instance, a manufacturer should be able to force a supplier to deliver products on time or adhering to a certain quality (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990) .
Without power, the buyer does not govern the relationship with its partner.
Researchers have identified two types of governance mechanisms (Heide, 1994; Weitz and Jap, 1995) : unilateral and bilateral. The difference between bilateral governance and unilateral governance is whether both exchange partners actively participate in the decision-making process (Weitz and Jap, 1995 
Performance
The manufacturer's buying performance is a result of its relationship with the supplier. When the supplier's performance is excellent, the manufacturer can enjoy a high buying performance. For example, when a supplier provides a manufacturer with a low price and the least defective components on time, the manufacturer's buying performance in relation to the supplier will be great. Thus, the manufacturer's buying performance is closely related to performance of the supplier. Effectiveness is how well an exchange party can achieve its goals (Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1992) . In the buyer-seller relationship, buyers try to decrease the rate of defective parts that are delivered (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990) , and increase the rate of on-time delivery (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990) .
Efficiency is the maximization of outputs relative to costs (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983) .
Manufacturers try to improve their efficiency in terms of profits and sales compared to their effort (Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1992) .
In addition to this outcome-based measurement for performance, there is another approach to assess performance (e.g. Bello and Gilliland 1997; Yan and Gray 1994) : evaluation the partner's performance.
This evaluation is a cognitive performance measure since the party evaluates the performance according to its degree of contentment. While an outcome based performance measure is an objective measure, a cognitive-based measure is a more subjective approach. In studies of buyer-seller relationships, the buyers can be satisfied with the partner's overall performance (Yan and Gray 1994) or can evaluate the partner's performance (Bello and Gilliland 1997) .
Among these various indicators that can be used to measure performance, the effectiveness of the buying performance and satisfaction with the supplier's performance are considered here for the following reasons.
First, since this research broadens the scope of the control mechanism through which manufacturers rely to increase their purchasing effectiveness, the effectiveness of the buying performance is also relevant. Second, the effectiveness of the partner is the reason why an exchange party interacts with its partner (Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1992 Third, since the effectiveness of the buying performance is an objective measure for performance, it is best to supplement this objective measure with a subjective measure to tap the performance better.
While the arithmetic numbers used as objective measures might not reflect comparative factors such as the increased effectiveness of the overall supplying performance, a subjective measure could reflect that factor, and the respondents will thus consider that factor when they evaluate the buying performance. For example, even though the arithmetic number of a supplier's delivery performance is high, the buyer could devalue its performance when competing vendors' supply performance is higher than that of the supplier. For these reasons, these two indicators are included in this research.
Benevolence
Benevolence is an important dimensions of trust (Doney and Cannon 1997) . Benevolence focuses on motives and intentions of the exchange partner (Doney and Cannon 1997), and it is an exchange party's belief that the exchange partner will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the party (Anderson and Narus 1990) . Voluntary dependence of the party on a partner is based on optimistic expectations of the outcomes (Hosmer 1995) .
Benevolence is a belief that a trustee does not take actions that would harm trustor (Hosmer 1995) . Thus, there is a possibility that trustor will be worse off if trust is not fulfilled than if it does not trust its trustee. Such opportunistic behavior on the part of supplier makes it difficult for the buyer to reach optimal outcomes, thereby reducing the buyer's commitment to the relationship.
H1: When a buyer's perception of supplier benevolence is low, the buyer's governance over the supplier will lead to an improved supplier performance.
A buyer's belief on its supplier's benevolence is derived by assessing the (calculation) supplier's benevolence (Madhavan and Grover 1998) . Thus, the higher the buyer's trust in its supplier for benevolence, the higher the prediction of the supplier's benevolent intention and behavior (Moorman et al., 1992) . Also, when a buyer feels supplier's benevolence, there is a low probability that the supplier betrays the buyer (Moorman et al., 1992) . Since this research is concerned with buyers' governance over the supplier, the heads of purchasing departments of the buying companies were chosen as key informants. Purchasing managers are responsible for securing materials from suppliers, hence they can be expected to be knowledgeable about resources dealt with and also about the nature of the relationships that can be cultivated with suppliers (Hutt and Speh 1992) .
A total of 980 questionnaires were mailed. 955
were delivered, and 25 questionnaires were undelivered while 192 were completed and returned to produce a response rate of 20.10%. All returned questionnaires were reviewed for completeness, and three questionnaires with numerous missing answers were dropped from the sample. The remaining 189 questionnaires were used in the analysis.
Nonresponse Bias
Corporate Affiliations Plus (2000) was used as a source of secondary data for the company's characteristics, both for responding and nonresponding firms. Comparisons across the numbers of employees and total sales also produced no significant differences (p< .52 for sales volume).
The response rates were compared across industry groups (electronics, metal, and steel), and were found to not differ.
Measure Development
All items used a 7-point Likert scale with 1 meaning "strongly disagree" and 7 meaning "strongly agree" (See Table 1 ). Benevolence was assessed with the items adopted from Doney and Cannon (1997).
The items for benevolence include supplier's concern regarding business success and the welfare of a respondent's company. The items to measure the level of unilateral governance assess the extent to which a manufacturer monitors the suppliers inventory level, quality control procedures, and performance (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990) .
Finally, the supplier's performance was defined as the manufacturer's overall evaluation of the supplier's performance in such areas as product quality, services, and delivery speed (Doney and Cannon, 1997).
Construct Validity
Each variable that was measured with multiple items was subjected to scale development and purification, and the process will be described in two steps. First, exploratory factor analyses were run for each set of constructs (i.e., trust, monitoring, and the norm of information sharing). Second, reliability analyses were run for each construct to ascertain that all the measures show satisfactory reliability. Several ill-fitting items were dropped due to low factor loadings (see Table 1 ). The resulting reduced sets of items were subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS. The discriminant validity for all 3 latent constructs was put through χ 2 difference tests. All constructs in
The Moderating Effect of Supplier Benevolence on the Relationship between Unilateral Governance and Supplier Performance  99 pairs (3 tests altogether) were tested to ascertain the extent to which the restricted model (in which the correlation was fixed as one) was significantly worse than the freely-estimated model (in which the correlated was estimated freely). All χ 2 differences were highly significant, which serves as evidence of the discriminant validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) . The results of the CFA, such as goodness-of-fit index, factor loading, and reliability are reported in 
Benevolence
When making important decisions, the supplier is concerned for our welfare.
When it comes to things that are important to us, we can depend on the supplier's support. We can count on the supplier to consider how its decisions and actions will affect us. Though circumstances change, we believe that the supplier will be ready and willing to offer us assistance and support.
The Unilateral Governance
Major supplier's production processes are to a large extent determined by your firm's requirements. Major supplier's engineering changes are to a large extent determined by your firm's requirements. Major supplier's level of inventory is to a large extent decided by your firm. Major Supplier's quality control procedures are to a large extent decided by your firm
Supplier Performance
Your firm is satisfied with Major Supplier's product quality. The service provided by Major Supplier is satisfactory. Your firm is satisfied with the overall supplying of Major Supplier. Your firm is satisfied with the on-time delivery performance of Major Supplier.
Buyer Power
It would be difficult for a major supplier to replace the sales and profits realized from your firm with another customer. Major supplier's total costs of switching to another comparable customer would be prohibitive. Major supplier could not find other customers to replace your company in your trade area, Major supplier is strongly dependent on your company. dependence on the supplier (Lusch and Brown 1996) .
The rationale behind including testing models with buyer's power over supplier is that the power allows a manufacturer to potentially have control over its supplier (Frazier and Antia 1995; Gaski 1984) . The correlation matrix for all variables in the test model is presented in Table 2 .
Ⅳ. Hypotheses Testing
The hypotheses were tested via multiple regression analysis. First, to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, performance (PERFORMANCE) was used as the dependent variable, and the independent variables included unilateral governance (UNIGOV) and benevolence (BENEVOLENCE).
UNIGOV and BENEVOLENCE were mean centered to eliminate potential multicollinearity (Aiken and West, 1991 
Theoretical Implications
This study offers evidence that benevolence works in the relationship between a buyer and its supplier.
The results of this study provide supplement transaction cost theory in explaining interfirm performance. According to transaction cost theory (Williamson 1985) , a buyer should act as if no party can be trusted because it is hard to identify benevolent partners who behave in the partner's interest. However, this study shows that a buyer relies on unilateral governance when it does not develop benevolence in the relationship with its supplier. Therefore, interfirm benevolence should be treated as an essential part of a buyer-supplier relationships.
This study demonstrates that firms do not always rely on unilateral governance when they can nurture interfirm benevolence in their exchange partners.
Considering the TCA view that exchange parties tend to behave opportunistically, unilateral governance should be used to reduce transaction costs (Williamson 1985) . This finding offers a view that TCA should add interfirm benevolence as a key variable to explain buyer-seller performance.
Managerial Implications
There are two managerial implications of this study. First, when a buyer needs to increase supplier performance, unilateral governance is not necessarily the best option. Since unilateral governance negatively affects buyer-supplier relationships, a buyer should find a way to avoid unilateral governance. For instance, when a buyer unilaterally control its supplier's inventory or product quality, it could hurt the supplier since the supplier might feel that it does not have autonomy over its inventory.
Second, when a buyer feels that it does not trust its supplier benevolence, it should unilaterally control its supplier. Since a buyer feel that its supplier does not take care of the buyer's business, the buyer should monitor the supplier behavior or output to 
Limitations and Future Research
This paper has a theoretical limitation. This study 
